Abstract-We consider a System of Systems (SoS) wherein each system Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , is composed of discrete cyber and physical components which can be attacked and reinforced. We characterize the disruptions using aggregate failure correlation functions given by the conditional failure probability of SoS given the failure of an individual system. We formulate the problem of ensuring the survival of SoS as a game between an attacker and a provider, each with a utility function composed of a survival probability term and a cost term, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. The survival probabilities of systems satisfy simple productform, first-order differential conditions, which simplify the Nash Equilibrium (NE) conditions. We derive the sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of SoS survival probability at NE on cost terms, correlation functions, and individual system survival probabilities. We apply these results to a simplified model of distributed cloud computing infrastructure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures such as cloud computing facilities and smart grids can be perceived as System of Systems (SoS), wherein each system S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , is composed of discrete cyber and physical components. The components of a system must be operational as individual units and also be available, such as being connected to the network. A component may be disrupted by a direct cyber or physical attack; in addition, it may be made unavailable by attacks on other components, even though it is operational by itself. The effects of disruptions may propagate among the components of S i , and also beyond to other systems S j , j = i. For example, consider a distributed cloud computing infrastructure with multiple server sites connected over a wide area network. A cyber attack on a server may bring it down, and a physical attack on a fiber line that connects a site to the network may render all servers at the site unavailable to cloud users. In an extreme case, the effects of component attacks may spread to entire SoS. The SoS provider is tasked with developing defense strategies to reinforce components of S i 's against attacks, by accounting for both types of disruption propagation, namely, within and between the systems. Let y i and x i be the number of components of S i attacked and reinforced, respectively, wherein a reinforced component survives a direct attack but may be disrupted indirectly. Let P i be the survival probability of S i , and P S be the survival probability of entire SoS. The aggregate failure correlation function C i (P i ) is the failure probability of "rest" of SoS (namely, without S i ) given the failure of S i . Intuitively, it indicates the relative importance of S i by capturing the fault propagation from S i to rest of SoS, which is denoted by S −i . In addition to these system-level correlations, those among the components of individual systems are characterized by simple product-form, first-order differential conditions on P i [20] using the system multiplier functions. These conditions subsume the contest success functions and statistical independence conditions as special cases, and lead to simplified estimates of survival probabilities at the Nash Equilibrium (NE). This two-level characterization of correlations is natural to SoS, for example, cloud computing and smart grid infrastructures [23] , and leads to a simplified analysis of NE conditions by "separating" system-level aspects from component-level details.
The reinforcements and attacks on components entail certain costs to the provider and attacker, respectively. In developing defense strategies, the provider should weigh the costs against benefits in terms of keeping SoS operational. This task requires taking into account both types of correlations described above as well as the costs incurred by the provider. We formulate a game wherein individual system components can be disrupted by the attacker, and can be reinforced by the provider to defend against them. The costs of attacks and reinforcements of systems are denoted by L A (y 1 , . . . , y N ) and L D (x 1 , . . . , x N ), respectively. The provider minimizes the disutility function given by a sum of two parts:
where the first part corresponds to reward and the second part corresponds to cost. Each part is a product of two terms: (i) first terms F D,G and F D,L are the reward and cost multiplier functions, respectively, of the provider, and (ii) second terms G D and L D represent the reward and cost of keeping SoS 978-1-5090-4623-2/17/$31.00 ©2017 IEEE operational, respectively. Similarly, the attacker's disutility function is given by
where (i) F A,G and F A,L are the reward and cost multiplier functions, respectively, of the attacker, and (ii) G A and L A represent the reward and cost of disrupting the operation of SoS, respectively. At NE, the attacker and provider minimize their respective disutility functions [8] . The previously studied sum-form [20] and product-form [21] utility functions are special cases of these disutility functions. The sum-form utility function is a linear combination of survival probability and cost parts such that G D = g D is a constant, and [20] , and it is given by
The product-form utility function is a product of the two terms such that F D,G = 0, F D,L = 1 − P S , and it is given by
The sum-form utility function represents a weaker coupling of the two terms, 1 − P S and L D , and leads to qualitatively different defense strategies compared to the product-form disutility. Typically, NE conditions for these two disutilities are obtained using somewhat different derivations. Our generalization provides a unified treatment of both forms, and also provides simple expressions for the sensitivity functions at NE involving a single gain-cost term that encompasses both forms. We derive NE conditions that show the dependence of P S on cost terms, correlation functions, system survival probabilities, and their partial derivatives. We also estimate the sensitivity functions of P i in terms of: (i) gain-cost term involving the cost and gain terms and their partial derivatives, (ii) system multiplier functions defined in Condition 3.3, and (iii) terms involving the correlation function and its partial derivative. These "separate" terms clearly indicate the relative importance of the correlations and system multiplier functions on P i at NE. These results extend previous results on interconnected systems in [10] , [11] by utilizing the aggregated correlations and system multiplier functions to capture more general dependencies. Also, the cyber-physical infrastructures considered in [22] , [23] constitute a special SoS class with N = 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We briefly describe related work in Section II. In Section III, we describe the discrete component infrastructure model along with the aggregate correlation function and differential conditions on system survival probabilities. We present a game-theoretic formulation in Section IV, and derive NE conditions and sensitivity estimates. We also describe the special case of OR systems in Section IV-A, wherein the correlation effects are significantly simplified. We apply the analytical results to a simple model of cloud computing in Section V. We present conclusions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Critical infrastructures [14] , [3] , [17] that support smart grids, cloud computing, and transportation systems are vital to national security. They can be viewed as system of systems, since they rely on complex networked systems each with disparate components. Game-theoretic methods have been extensively applied to capture the interactions between providers and attackers of critical infrastructures [1] , [4] , [24] ; they lead to strategies that ensure their continued operation in the presence of evolving threats. Several of these infrastructures are modeled using complex dynamic models of the underlying physical systems [2] , in particular, using partial differential equations. In general, both game-theoretic formulations and their solutions are quite extensive for such infrastructures, including: games with multiple time-scales of system dynamics [13] ; incomplete information games under partial knowledge of system dynamics and attack models [18] ; and multiple-target games with possibly competing objectives [25] . A comprehensive review of the defense and attack models in various game-theoretic formulations has been presented in [12] . In particular, game theory has been applied in a variety of cyber security applications [15] , [26] , and in particular for securing cyber-physical networks [5] with applications to power grids [6] , [16] , [19] , [9] .
The system reliability and robustness parameters and variables can be explicitly integrated into these game formulations [1] , for example for smart grids, cloud computing infrastructures and transportation systems. Within this class, Stackelberg game formulations using discrete models of cyberphysical infrastructures have been studied in various forms [7] , and a subclass of them is formulated using the number of cyber and physical components that are attacked and reinforced [23] . These formulations characterize the infrastructures with a large number of components, and are coarser than formulations that consider the attack and defense of individual cyber and physical components. In particular, these works utilize the correlation functions to capture the dependencies between the survival probabilities of two systems, namely, the cyber and physical sub-infrastructures. Complex interacting systems that consist of several such systems have been studied using gametheoretic formulations in [11] , and their two-level correlations have been studied using the sum-form utility functions [20] and the product-form disutility functions [21] .
The sum-form utility represents a gain-centric priority, wherein the gain term g D weighted by 1 − P S plus the cost term is minimized by the provider. The product-form disutility, on the other hand, represents a cost-centric priority, wherein the expected cost is to be minimized. In terms of analysis, these two formulations have a certain degree of commonality but there are also differences; in particular, estimates of P S can be obtained somewhat directly for the product-form as shown in [21] . Also, they lead to qualitatively different defense strategies, and in particular P S appears explicitly in the sensitivity estimates of system survival probabilities in the product-form but not in the sum-form. The sum-form and product-form disutility functions are specific examples of the general diutility function presented in this paper.
III. DISCRETE SYSTEM MODELS
We capture the interactions between a system S i and rest of SoS S −i in terms of their survival probabilities using the aggregate correlation function C i and its companion function C −i represented by the conditional failure probability of S i given the failure of S −i [20] . We denote the failure probability of S j by Pj = 1 − P j , j = −N, . . . , −(N − 1), −1, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, N . The survival probability of SoS is given by
where the last term corresponds to the probability that either of S i and S −i is non-operational. Then, we have
wherein the last term is the joint failure probability of S i and S −i given by
We highlight the dependence on P i by explicitly showing it as an operand of C i and C −i . Condition 3.1: Aggregate Correlation Function: The probability that SoS is operational is given by
We now present illustrative cases for the aggregate correlation function. In the special case where the failure of S i leads to definite failure of rest of SoS, we have C i (P i ) = 1 such that P S = P −i , that is, the survival probability of SoS solely depends on S −i . Under the statistical independence of failures of S i and S −i , we have C −i (P i ) = 1 − P i , since the failure probability of S i does not depend on that of S −i . Consequently we have P S = P i P −i . In a simple cloud infrastructure with N S servers where the fiber connections are represented by system S F , we have P S = 1 − N S (1 − P F )/K, where K is a normalization constant. In this case, we have C F = N S /K, which shows that the fiber failure rate is amplified by N S in rendering the servers unavailable.
We now consider that the effects of reinforcements and attacks can be separated at the system level such that (i) ∂P−i ∂xi ≈ 0, which indicates that reinforcing S i does not directly impact the survival probability of the rest of SoS, and (ii) ∂Pi ∂xj ≈ 0 for j = i, which indicates that reinforcing S j does not directly impact the survival probability of S i . We capture such system-level considerations for the provider using the following condition.
Condition 3.2: For P S in Condition 3.1, we have for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , j = 1, 2, . . . , N , j = i,
for the provider.
A special class called OR systems corresponds to zero correlations such that Pī ∪−i = Pī + P −i or equivalently Pī ∩−i = 0. Thus, we have P S = P i,−i = P i +P −i −1, C i = 0, and C −i = 0. These systems represent some of the simplest systems [20] to analyze due to the absence of correlations as will be shown in Section IV-A.
A. System Survival Probabilities
We consider that the system survival probabilities satisfy the following differential condition, which was originally defined for cyber and physical sub-infrastructures [22] . Condition 3.3: The survival probabilities P i and P −i of system S i and S −i , respectively, satisfy the following conditions: there exist system multiplier functions Λ i and Λ −i such that
We now illustrate two cases for which the above condition is satisfied.
(a) Statistically Independent Component Failures: Let p i|R and p i|N denote the conditional survival probability of a component of S i with and without reinforcement, respectively. Under the statistical independence condition of component failures, the probability that S i with N i components survives the attacks is
Ni−xi i|N [22] , which in turn leads to
The contest survival functions are to express P i in [11] such that P i = ξ+xi ξ+xi+yi , which in turn leads to
IV. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
The provider's objective is to make the infrastructure resilient by reinforcing x i components of S i and minimizing the corresponding disutility function. Similarly, the attacker's objective is to disrupt the infrastructure by attacking y i components of S i and minimizing the corresponding disutility function. NE conditions are derived by equating the corresponding derivatives of disutility functions to zero, which yields
∂P S as the composite gain-cost term, and
as the gain-cost gradient with respect to x i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Hence, at NE we have the following simplified condition
For the attacker, we similarly obtain
A. OR Systems
The OR systems [22] constitute a SoS sub-class where simultaneous failures of two or more systems is extremely unlikely, namely, their probability is zero. These systems are simpler to analyze due to the absence of system-level correlation terms, and indeed an estimate of P i can be derived as a simple ratio of gain-cost gradient and system multiplier function Λ i . Using P S = P i + P −i − 1, we obtain
where Θ i (·) is called the scaled gain-cost gradients of system S i . Then, Condition 3.3 provides us an estimate for the survival probability of S i as the ratio of scaled gain-cost gradient and system multiplier function given bỹ
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . These estimates for individual systems depend mainly on the corresponding scaled gain-cost gradients, and thus represent a "separation" of the individual systems at this level. In this sense, OR systems constitute an important analytical case wherein the correlations between the individual systems may be ignored. In addition, these estimates provide the sensitivity information of the survival probabilities of the individual systems with respect to various quantities of S i . In particular, the survival probability estimateP i;D is proportional to the corresponding weighted cost and reward functions and inversely proportional to their weighted derivatives. This seemingly counter-intuitive trend applies only to the set of Nash equilibria and not to the overall system behavior. In the rest of the paper, we denote Λ i (x 1 , . . . , x N , y i , . . . , y N ) and Θ i (x 1 , . . . , x N , y i , . . . , y N ), by Λ i and Θ i , respectively, to simplify the notation.
B. NE Sensitivity Functions
We now derive estimates for P i and P −i at NE using partial derivatives of the cost and failure correlation functions to infer qualitative information about their sensitivities to different parameters.
Theorem 4.1: Aggregate Correlation Function: Under Conditions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, an estimate of the survival probability of rest of the infrastructure S −i , for
, and, for
.
An estimate of the survival probability of system S i iŝ
Proof: At NE, we have
By using the formulae in Condition 3.2, we have
We now substitute expressions for ∂Pi ∂xi and ∂P−i ∂xj based on Condition 3.3, and obtain the system of equations:
The expression forP −i;D is obtained by solving for P −i using quadratic Equation 2, and the expression forP i;D follows from quadratic Equation 1. The estimatesP −i;D andP i;D above provide sensitivity information about the corresponding survival probabilities with respect to various parameters (the estimates may not necessarily lie within [0,1]). In particular, they qualitatively relate P i and P −i to the aggregate correlation function C −i between them. In these estimates, however, the quantities related to S i are essentially captured by the ratios Θj Λ−i and Θi Λi , which do not involve the aggregate correlation function. In fact, the dependence on the correlation function can be discussed separately from these ratios.
As indicated above, there are significant system-level interactions reflected in bothP −i;D andP i;D compared to OR systems. In particular,P −i;D depends on both C −i (·) and its partial derivative with respect to P −i ; while an increase in the former leads to a decrease inP −i;D , the effect of the latter depends on its sign and it can in some cases mitigate the decrease due to the former. AlsoP −i;D depends on the partial derivative of L D with respect to x j multiplied by (1 − P S ), and this multiplication factor is not present in similar expressions derived for sum-form utilities [20] . It also depends on Θ j (which involves the cost factor L D and its derivative) and Λ −i as expected. Its dependence on P i is through the failure correlation function C −i (P i ). The qualitative behavior ofP i;D is quite similar with respect to L D in Θ i . And, they both are affected by Λ −i and Λ i , and each of them in turn depends on the number of component attacks and reinforcements of system S i . Thus, the estimatesP −i;D andP i;D reflect the system-level correlations between S −i and S i explicitly through C −i (P i ) term; they also represent component-level correlations indirectly through Λ −i and Λ i terms.
V. DISTRIBUTED CLOUD COMPUTING INFRASTRUCTURE
A distributed cloud computing infrastructure consists of N S sites, with L k servers at site k, k = 1, 2, . . . , N S as shown in Figure 1 . These sites are connected over a communication network wherein each router manages L N connections as shown in Figure 2 . Servers and routers can be brought down by cyber attacks, and the communication fibers that connect server sites to routers may be physically cut. To reinforce the components of this infrastructure, servers and routers may be replicated, and redundant fiber lines may be installed.
This infrastructure is modeled by SoS consisting of 2N S +2 systems where S (k,c) and S (k,p) represent the cyber and physical models of server site k, and S (N S +1,c) and S (N S +1,p) represent the cyber and physical models of the communications network as illustrated in Figure 2 . Thus, in terms of original indices, we have:
The relationships between the aggregate correlation functions can be captured as follows (as described in [20] ). For the communications network, we have
which reflects that a router attack will disrupt all its L N connections. For the sites, we have the opposite given by
which indicates that at site k the fiber disruption will disconnect all its servers. This multiplicative effect carries over to partial differentials since For illustration, we now consider that the attacker and provider choose components to attack and protect, respectively, according to the uniform distribution. Then, corresponding to the site cyber models 
which interestingly does not depend on x (k,c) . Since the term Λ (k,c) appears in the denominator,P (k,c);D in Theorem 4.1 decreases with the number of cyber attacks y (k,c) , and increases with [y (k,p) −x (k,p) ] + which is the number of physical attacks exceeding the reinforcements. The latter condition may appear counter-intuitive at the surface but note that it only characterizes the states that satisfy NE conditions. An analogous dependence ofP −i;D =P −(k,c);D andP j;D = P (k,p);D on the parameters x (k,c) , x (k,p) , y (k,c) , and y (k,p) (shown in Theorem 4.1) is less direct since Λ −(k,c) and Λ (k,p) , respectively, appear inside the square root but is qualitatively somewhat similar since they appear in the denominator. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A class of system of systems each with discrete cyber and physical components are studied under the general disutility functions. The components of a system can be disrupted directly or indirectly by either a cyber or physical attack. They can be reinforced against such attacks by explicitly taking into account the correlations between the systems and also between the components within individual systems. These reinforcements entail certain costs which should be weighted against their benefits.
By formulating a game between an infrastructure provider and attacker, we derived Nash Equilibrium conditions in terms of the partial derivatives of cost terms, failure correlation functions and survival probabilities of component systems and their partial derivatives. We then estimated the sensitivity functions that indicate the dependence of the infrastructure survival probability on these quantities. We applied this approach to models of cloud computing infrastructures. These results extend previous results on interconnected systems [10] , [11] and cyber-physical infrastructures [22] by using the general disutility functions, with the sum-form utility functions [20] and the product-form disutility functions [21] as specific examples. These results enable us to derive cost-centric strategies using a simple model of cloud computing infrastructures.
Several extensions of the formulation studied in this paper can be pursued in future studies, including cases where the effects of attacks and reinforcements of specific individual components are explicitly accounted for. Another future direction is to consider the simultaneous cyber and physical attacks on multiple components. It would be interesting to study sequential game formulations of this problem, and cases where different levels of knowledge are available to each party. Applications of our approach to more detailed models of cloud computing infrastructures, smart energy grid infrastructures and high-performance computing complexes would be of future interest. It would also be of future interest to explore the applicability of this overall method to continuous models such as partial differential equations describing the individual systems or the entire infrastructure.
